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Abstract 
In his lecture notes, the Salamanca scholar Mancio de Corpus Christi († 1576) dealt 
extensively with the moral-theological question of whether a possessor in doubt as to his 
entitlement of a possession, lacks the necessary good faith for acquisitive prescription. 
Mancio discusses, evaluates and compares existing opinions of moral theologians of his time 
on the matter and expounds on his own teaching. The dialectical discourse reveals that opting 
for a more or less minimalistic concept of morality is one of the decisive factors.  
 
Resumen 
En sus apuntes de clase, el estudioso salmantino Mancio de Corpus Christi († 1576) trató de 
un modo exhaustivo la cuestión teológico-moral de si el poseedor que duda de su derecho a la 
posesión, carece de la buena fe necesaria para la prescripción adquisitiva. Mancio analiza, 
evalúa y compara las opiniones de los teólogos morales de su época a este respecto y expone 
su propia doctrina. El discurso dialéctico muestra que optar por un concepto de moralidad más 
o menos minimalista constituye uno de los factores más decisivos. 
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question. 3. Doubt and good faith: three opinions. 3.1 The view of the Ordinary Gloss to the Liber 
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range of opinions. 8. Mancio’s own position in the debate. 9. To conclude: “dubium superveniens non 
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 In the civilian tradition, good faith is considered a requirement for legitimate possession 
and acquisition of ownership through prescription. Good faith (bona fides) is the belief of 
being entitled to the thing one possesses. If this possession is acquired on the basis of a 
contract of sale, it encompasses the belief that the vendor had authority to alienate. Bad faith 
(mala fides) by contrast, is knowing that someone else is entitled to the thing one possesses 
e.g. because one is aware of the fact that the vendor lacked the necessary authority to alienate. 
The sources of law qualify the position of the possessor in terms of this dichotomy: i.e. being 
in good faith or bad faith but it can seriously be questioned whether in the day-to-day reality 
of legal intercourse, every possessor can be subsumed within the two categories mentioned. In 





many cases, evidence may exist which deprives the possessor of the firm belief of being 
entitled but at the same time does not clearly show that there is someone else who can assert a 
claim. How should such a doubting possessor be qualified? Is he in good faith or in bad faith? 
The answer to this question has various legal implications, since in the civilian tradition good 
faith enables the possessor to enjoy the fruits of his possession; grants him the favourable 
position of defendant when possession is claimed in court (Passivlegitimation); and allows 
him to acquire ownership through prescription. 
 
 Despite the fact that this question has a distinct legal nature, in the two Corpora of learned 
law there are hardly any provisions, dealing with the effects of the possessor’s doubt. As will 
be shown below, in one text from the Digest, D. 41.1.48pr, it is possible to discern the odd 
clue. However, this could only be achieved through a certain emendation of the wording, 
since in both Vulgate and critical edition of the Digest, the text deals with a buyer in good 
faith and rules that the latter will undoubtedly acquire ownership of the fruits: “the possessor 
in good faith undoubtedly makes the fruits his own”.1 Also, a text in Gratian’s Decree, C.34 
q.1-2 c.5, derived from Saint Augustine (354-430),2 was sometimes used as a starting point 
for discussing the consequences of doubt, viz. in the sense that doubt does not entail bad faith 
and, accordingly, good faith continues to be present. The text, however, only refers to good 
faith and bad faith. It rules that as long as a woman does not know she is married to another 
woman’s husband − and accordingly, in good faith, performs marital duties − she does not 
commit adultery. This woman is subsequently compared with a possessor in good faith: “as in 
title to tenements, one is called correctly a possessor in good faith, as long as one does not 
know one possesses another’s plot of land, because if one knows and does not part with the 
possession to which the other is entitled, then one is said to be in bad faith and one will justly 
be called to be unjust”.3 
 
 The sources of Roman law and Canon law do not reveal why the question of being in doubt 
was not considered. This could have to do with procedural difficulties. If doubt would indeed 
exclude good faith and, accordingly, would prevent the possessor from acquiring ownership 
through prescription, it is the entitled one who, being the plaintiff in litigation, carries the 
burden of proving the existence of the defendant’s doubt. However, doubt is not positive 
knowledge which may easily be established or can be presumed; and doubt, which exists in 
the possessor’s psyche, belongs to the realm of the human mind and is something which the 
outer world will often fail to comprehend. Good faith is required for acquisitive prescription 
also in the forum internum,4 but here the question as to the effects of doubt seems to be more 
                                                 
 1 D. 41.1.48 Paulus libro septimo ad Plautium pr. Bonae fidei emptor non dubie percipiendo 
fructus etiam ex aliena re suos interim facit non tantum eos, qui diligentia et opera eius pervenerunt, 
sed omnes, quia quod ad fructus attinet, loco domini paene est. denique etiam priusquam percipiat, 
statim ubi a solo separati sunt, bonae fidei emptoris fiunt. nec interest, ea res, quam bona fide emi, 
longo tempore capi possit nec ne, veluti si pupilli sit aut vi possessa aut praesidi contra legem 
repetundarum donata ab eoque abalienata sit bonae fidei emptori. 
 2 Cf. Augustine, De fide et operibus, n. 7. 
 3 C.34 q.1-2 c.5 Non est adultera uirgo, quae nesciens uiro nubit alieno. Si uirgo nesciens uiro 
nupserit alieno, hoc si semper nesciat, numquam ex hoc erit adultera. Si autem sciat, iam ex hoc esse 
incipit, ex quo cum alieno sciens cubauerit, sicut in iure prediorum tamdiu quisque bonae fidei 
possessor rectissime dicitur, quamdiu se possidere ignorat alienum; cum uero scierit, nec ab aliena 
possessione recesserit, tunc malae fidei perhibetur, tunc iuste iniustus uocabitur (…). 
 4 Cf. Hallebeek, J., “Early Modern Scholasticism on acquisitive and extinctive prescription”, 
Praescriptionibus iura tolluntur [Comparative studies in continental and Anglo-American legal 
history] (E.J.H. Schrage e.a. eds.), Berlin, 2018 (forthcoming). 





obvious. After all, the possessor himself will be aware of the deep stirrings of his soul and his 
spiritual councillor or confessor can take these into account in order to determine the just and 
appropriate line of action in the specific situation. This difference may explain why the 
question of the consequences of doubt is scarcely discussed for the forum externum, but 
abundantly for the forum internum. 
 
 In this contribution, I would like to focus on the moral-theological debate in early modern 
scholasticism concerning the problem just mentioned i.e. the effects of doubt. In so doing, I 
have taken the most instructive lecture notes of Mancio de Corpus Christi († 1576) as a 
guideline. These notes record the divergent approaches to the matter which were already in 
existence by the middle of the sixteenth century. The rendering by Mancio will be compared 
with the writings of the discussed scholars. This is not always easy and, due to various 
circumstances, will not always result in a clear and univocal picture. The notes of Mancio do 
not always contain precise references. The printed writings, as handed down, are not 
necessarily those consulted by Mancio and may display an earlier or later opinion of the same 
scholar than that considered in the notes. Moreover, Mancio may have adapted or simplified 
the various opinions for didactical purposes. We should also realize that we are dealing here 
with lecture notes, not a text which was edited to be published. On the whole, however, the 
paraphrases of Mancio can be confirmed by what is recorded in the printed works of the 
scholars themselves. They produce a reasonably reliable image of the status questionis in the 
middle of the sixteenth century and an excellent survey of the entire range of divergent 
approaches by the first generations of early modern scholastics, which underpin all later 
treatises of the subject. Those various approaches are not always simple and obvious. 
Nonetheless, I will depict these views, as seen through the eyes of Mancio, as faithfully as 
possible; albeit it in connection with the primary sources and attempt to analyse the way 
Mancio evaluates and compares these opinions. 
 
 The moral-theological perspective implies that a choice has to be made whether to tend 
towards a more rigoristic or more laxistic attitude. The uncertainty about a factual situation 
(Am I entitled? Is someone else entitled?) implies also uncertainty as to which line of action is 
morally correct. When I am the owner of what I possess, I may resign myself to the factual 
status quo. When I am not entitled to the thing I possess, a different line of action is required. 
I have to find out the truth or abandon the possession. The one who doubts will face a 
quandary and has to make a choice. The more rigoristic approach requires to take no risk and 
act just as a possessor in bad faith would have to. The doubting possessor opts in such a case 
for moral certainty (tutiorism) although that may be disadvantageous to him. A more laxistic 
attitude, on the contrary, morally approves of any option (and corresponding line of action) as 
long as it seems probable (probabilism). The doubting possessor should take as starting point 
a probable premise, not the most probable one. That implies that he may act as if he is 
entitled, which in many respects can be less disadvantageous. From the more rigoristic 
perspective, as a matter of fact, the latter carries a considerable moral risk. Below it will 
become clear whether the scholars, scrutinized by Mancio, revealed a minimalistic or less 
minimalistic concept of morality.5 
 
 Mancio discusses the question of the doubting possessor for the forum internum, as did the 
late medieval manuals for confessors, and yet his treatment of the subject is relevant for the 
                                                 
 5 For the minimalistic concept of morality in early modern scholasticism see Decock, W., 
Theologians and contract law, The moral transformation of the ius commune (ca. 1500-1650), Leiden 
& Boston, 2013, pp. 73-82. 





history of law and history of legal thought. The problem discussed is imbedded in legal 
practice. It concerns a quandary which can arise in day-to-day business traffic. Moreover, as 
will be shown, the dialectical approach of early modern moral theology is by no means 
reluctant to adduce arguments derived from the sources of law. Furthermore, a comparison 
between the two fora continuously urges itself upon the reader. Moral-theological thinking 
and legal thinking are never kept strictly separate. 
 
  
2. Mancio de Corpus Christi and his approach to the question 
 
 The first moral-theological works, which granted a fully-fledged position to the question of 
the doubting possessor, date back to the middle of the sixteenth century. It was discussed, for 
example, in the Codex de restitutione et contractibus of Juan de Medina (1489-1545) who 
taught at Alcalá de Henares. This work was published posthumously in 1546.6 Less known is 
the treatment of the question in the notes of Mancio, who taught at Salamanca. These lecture 
notes, dating from the years 1565-1566, were edited only in the last century by Augusto 
Sarmiento (b. 1941, University of Navarra).7 The treatments of the question whether doubt 
affects good faith by Medina and Mancio lay at the root of a continuous tradition in early 
modern scholasticism of discussing the subject, leading to an extensive and extremely detailed 
case-based analysis in the seventeenth century. In the Commentariorum in disputationem de 
justitia ... liber primus of Miguel Bartolomé Salón (1539-1621), first published in 1591, the 
question already covered fourteen columns in folio.8 
 
 Mancio, or Mancio de Corpus Christi, was born in Becerril de Campos, probably in 1507. 
He studied in Salamanca, where he entered the order of the Dominicans. He continued his 
studies under Francesco de Vitoria (1483-1546) and Domingo de Soto (1494-1560). From 
1548 he taught at Alcalá de Henares and from 1564 at Salamanca. He died in Salamanca on 
the 9th of July 1576.9 
 
 Mancio starts the discussion concerning the effects of doubt on good faith by stating that 
the designation ‘good’ in ‘good faith’ requires this faith (fides) to be intact (integra), sound 
(sana) and stable (non vacillans).10 This lead obviously to the question whether doubt will 
affect good faith. Mancio presents it as a serious or considerable problem (in Latin magna 
quaestio): may the one who doubts the thing he possesses is his, enjoy the benefit of 
prescription?11 The treatment has a scholastic structure. First, Mancio describes three 
                                                 
 6 Joannes Medina, Tomus secundus in quo de restitutione et contractibus (...) agitur, ed. Ingolstadt 
1581, pp. 116-118 (Quaestio XVII: De fide ad praescribendam necessariam).  
 7 Sarmiento, A., “Textos inéditos de la Escuela de Salamanca (Mancio, De la justicia)”, Persona y 
derecho 10 (1983), pp. 421-468; Sarmiento, A., “Textos inéditos de la Escuela de Salamanca (Mancio, 
Del dominio)”, Persona y derecho, 12 (1985), pp. 243-321. The fragment on prescription by a 
doubting possessor can be found on pp. 283-289.  
 8 See Michael Bartholomeus Salon, Commentariorum in disputationem de iustitia quam habet 
Divus Thomas secunda sectione secundae partis suae Summae Theologicae (…) Liber primus, ed. 
Valencia 1591, columns 584-597 (Tractatus de dominio rerum, q. 5, art. 7, An fides dubia sufficiat ad 
praescribendum). 
 9 Beltrán de Heredia, V., “El maestro Mancio de Corpus Christi O.P.”, La Ciencia Tomista 51 
(1935), pp. 7-103, reprinted in: Miscelania Beltrán de Heredia IV, Salamanca, 1972, pp. 363-446. 
 10 Sarmiento 1985, p. 283. 
 11 Sarmiento 1985, p. 283: Sed hinc nascitur magna quaestio: utrum possessor qui dubitat rem esse 
suam, gaudeat beneficio praescrìptionis. 





established opinions, which he eventually rejects. Subsequently, he formulates three notes or 
observations. In the third place he reveals his own teachings in four conclusions and, finally, 
he refutes the main arguments, supporting the opinions with which he disagreed.12 
 
 
3. Doubt and good faith: three opinions 
 
 We will now first see what the three existing opinions entail which Mancio describes, i.e. 
those of the Ordinary Gloss to the Liber Extra; Adrian of Utrecht (1459-1523); and that of 
Mancio’s own master Domingo de Soto. The three have in common, that they answer the 
question in the affirmative: despite his doubting faith the possessor will acquire ownership 
through prescription. There are, however, mutual differences. While the Gloss was primarily 
pronouncing upon the Canon law of the forum externum, Adrian and Soto pronounced upon 
the forum internum. Moreover, the Gloss maintained in general terms that doubt does not 
affect good faith, whereas Adrian and Soto approved of prescription by a doubting possessor, 
only if certain conditions were met. Mancio provides concise summaries of these three 
opinions, containing arguments, which he finally would refute. We will discuss these 
paraphrases, taking into account also the early treatment of the issue by Medina and the 
original writings of the authors referred to.  
 
 
3.1 The view of the Ordinary Gloss to the Liber Extra 
 
 The first view is that of the gloss nulla temporis parte to X 2.26.20, the canon Quoniam 
omne, which opinion is said to be followed by the Italian canonist Nicolaus de Tudeschis 
(1386-1445), also known as Panormitanus, and by the Italian Dominican Silvestro Mazzolini 
da Prierio (1456-1527), also known as Prierias.13 The gist of it is that doubt does not take 
away the good faith required for prescription. 
 
 Quoniam omne was canon 41 of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, which took place 
under Pope Innocent III († 1216). It was adopted in the Liber Extra as X 2.26.20. It ruled that 
a possessor should never during the entire period of prescription have the knowledge 
(conscientia) that the possession belongs to another. The gloss nulla temporis parte discussed 
the case where the possessor had a good reason (iusta causa) to doubt whether he is entitled. 
It ruled that, in view of D. 22.1.25.2, he is nevertheless considered to be in good faith and that 
he can acquire through prescription, despite his doubting conscience. The conscience is 
                                                 
 12 For the framework, used in early modern scholasticism to treat a certain subject, see Decock. W. 
& Birr, C., Recht und Moral in der Scholastik der frühen Neuzeit 1500-1750 [Methodica – 
Einführungen in die rechtshistorische Forschung, 1], Berlin etc., 2016, pp. 67-68. 
 13 Sarmiento 1985, p. 283: De hac quaestione sunt variae sententiae. Prima opinio tenet partem 
affirmativam. Hanc habet Glossa super cap. finale De praescrìptionibus. Item Panormitanus et 
Silvester verbo Praescriptio § 3. Et probatur ex cap. Si virgo 34 q. unica -ait Augustinus-: “possessor 
bonae fidei tamdiu iudicatur quamdiu possidere se ignorat alienum, si vero scit iam est in mala fide”; 
sed qui dubitat, ignorat et non scit an possideat rem alienam; ergo praescrìbit. Deinde: possessor qui 
dubitat, id est in dubio sine peccato, potest defendere rem suam, nam in dubiis melior est conditio 
possidentis; ergo habet bonam fidem. 3°. In cap. finali De praescrìptionibus statuit Summus Pontifex 
eum qui praescrìbit non debere habere conscientiam rei alienae; sed qui dubitat non habet 
conscientiam rei alienae; ergo. Item: eodem capite 1° definit fidem bonam debere durare toto tempore 
a lege praescripto, ne peccatum alicui suffragetur; sed qui possidet in dubio, nihil peccat; ergo potest 
gaudere beneficio praescriptionis. 





doubting, but not troubled (laesa) the gloss argued because the possessor does not yet know 
whether the object is another’s property. He should consult others in order to find out the truth 
(with references to D.37 c.16 and C.23 q.8 c.14). In the commentary of Pope Innocent IV 
(1195-1254) on the Liber Extra, it was also argued that good faith which suffices for 
acquisition of fruits also suffices for prescription.14 It has to be noted, however, that D. 
22.1.25.2 did not pronounce upon prescription by a doubting possessor. It ruled that as long as 
no eviction has taken place, the possessor of a plot of land is to be considered possessor in 
good faith and acquires the fruits by taking possession of these fruits, despite the fact he 
knows the land belongs to another. 
 
 This opinion of the Gloss was substantiated with three arguments. The first was the text 
from Gratian’s Decree, mentioned above (C.34 q.1-2 c.5). From this text, more specifically 
the words “one is called correctly a possessor in good faith, as long as one does not know one 
possesses another’s plot of land” it was gathered, as summarized by Mancio, that the one who 
doubts is still in good faith, since he does not know for sure that another is entitled (argument 
i). Accordingly, he acquires ownership through prescription. Secondly, there is the rule of law 
saying that “when in doubt the position of the possessor is the better one” (in dubiis melior est 
conditio possidentis). This rule is reminiscent of legal maxims, to be found in the Digest and 
in the Liber Sextus. In the Digest it is phrased as “when situations are equal, the position of 
the possessor should be the stronger one” (in pari causa possessor potior haberi debet, D. 
50.17.128pr), in the Liber Sextus as “when the delicts or the situations are equal, the position 
of the possessor is the stronger one” (in pari delicto vel causa potior est conditio possidentis, 
VI 5.13.65). These maxims implied that, when two people, both claiming to be entitled to one 
and the same thing are equally at fault and have equal arguments to substantiate their claims, 
the position of the possessor, i.e. the one who actually has the thing among his belongings, 
should prevail. He may defend his position, while the burden of proof will rest on the other 
party. In the new phrasing the ‘equal situation’ was replaced by ‘when in doubt’. Applied to 
the question under dispute, it would imply that a possessor who is in doubt, may defend his 
position and that his possession is not illegitimate and apparently suffices for prescription 
(argument ii). 
 
 In the third place, the canon Quoniam omne (X 2.26.20) ruled that in order to acquire a 
right through prescription one should not be aware of the fact it is another man’s thing one 
possesses (conscientia rei alieni). However, this would not apply to the one who is in doubt 
(argument iii). Furthermore, the same canon ruled that good faith is required during the entire 
period of prescription, so that sin will not benefit anyone.15 Again, the one who possesses in 
doubt does not commit any sin. As a consequence, he may enjoy the benefit of prescription 
(argument iv). 
 
 As stated above, Panormitanus and Prierias would have endorsed this view of the Gloss. In 
his commentary to the canon Quoniam omne (X 2.26.20) Panormitanus referred to C.34 q.1-2 
c.5, mentioned above. The words of Augustine, quoted there, would prove that also the 
doubting possessor is in good faith and will acquire through prescription, as in X 1.4.8 and X 
                                                 
 14 Commentarii Innocentii Quarti Pontificis Maximi super libros quinque decretalium, ed. Frankfurt 
am Main 1570, fol. 303vb (ad X 2.26.20, n. 2). 
 15 X 2.26.20 Non in foro canonico nec civili valet praescriptio cum mala fide. Idem in concilio 
generali. Quoniam omne, quod non est ex fide, peccatum est, synodali iudicio diffinimus, ut nulla 
valeat absque bona fide praescriptio tam canonica quam civilis, quum generaliter sit omni constitutioni 
atque consuetudini derogandum, quae absque mortali peccato non potest observari. Unde oportet, ut 
qui praescribit in nulla temporis parte rei habeat conscientiam alienae. 





2.26.15. Moreover, in C. 7.32.1 (prescription starts to run as soon as someone is informed that 
he has acquired possession through an intermediary) Panormitanus did not read the 
counterargument: that lack of knowledge can prevent prescription from starting because in 
that text the recipient of the possession was initially not aware of the fact that he had gained 
possession (through an intermediary) and in such a situation he was neither in good faith nor 
in bad faith.16 
 
 In his Summa Summarum, a manual for confessors, also termed the Summa Sylvestrina, 
Prierias first described the opinion of the Gloss and Panormitanus, that the doubting possessor 
has to make inquiries and should be prepared to part with his possession but that at the same 
time he has the good faith required for prescription. Subsequently, Sylvester referred to 
various deviating opinions. In his commentary on X 2.26.20, Antonius de Butrio (1338-1408) 
taught that doubts will wipe out the required good faith, at least if these doubts are serious and 
plausible. The legal provisions not only require not to be in bad faith, but also to be in good 
faith. The Summa rosella of the Franciscan Baptista Trovamala de Salis († after 1494) would 
have followed the same opinion, albeit without drawing distinctions, while according to the 
Summa Angelica of Angelus de Clavasio (1411-1495) doubts do not take away good faith for 
the forum externum. Eventually Prierias presented his own view, following the teachings of 
Bartolus de Saxoferrato (1313-1357) ad D. 41.3.5 (n. 9), that doubt at the beginning (when 
possession was acquired) excludes good faith, but that later emerging doubt does not.17 
 
 
3.2 The view of Adrian of Utrecht 
 
 The second opinion, brought up by Mancio, is that of Adrian of Utrecht (1459-1523), better 
known as the later Pope Hadrian VI.18 It is derived from his commentary on the Fourth Book 
of the Sentences, reflecting the lectures Adrian presented, presumably between 1499 and 
1509, at the University of Leuven.19 The gist of this opinion is that doubt takes away good 
faith as required for prescription. For that reason, Medina had presented the opinion of Adrian 
as opposed to that of the Gloss and Panormitanus.20 In the approach of Mancio, however, both 
opinions, i.e. that of the Gloss and that of Adrian, have in common that they do not utterly 
                                                 
 16 Panormitanus, Commentaria V (super tertia parte secundi libri decretalium), ed. Venice 1617, ad 
X 2.26.20, n. 40 (fol. 47rb). 
 17 Sylvestrinae summae pars secunda, ed. Antwerp 1578, ad verbum ‘praescriptio I’ (p. 305). This 
would be confirmed by the text of C.34 q.1-2 c.5: the woman did not realize she married a man, who 
was already someone’s husband. Her later knowledge of the truth would make her commit adultery, 
but knowledge should be taken here as knowing for sure and not as doubting. 
 18 Sarmiento 1985, pp. 283-284: Secunda opinio est Adriani in materia de restitutione, ubi dicit 
duo. Alterum est: possessor qui dubitat rem esse suam, non potest eam sine peccato possidere nec 
praescribere. Ratio huius est quoniam talis conscientia est laesa. Item probat nam uxor quae dubitat an 
iste maritus sit suus, stante dubio non potest petere nec reddere debitum; ergo similiter possessor qui 
dubitat, non potest rem possidere. Deinde: qui facit aliquid de quo dubitat an sit peccatum mortale, 
peccat mortaliter, sed qui possidet rem in dubio furti opus de quo dubitat an sit peccatum mortale; ergo 
etc. Probatur minor nam furtum est detentio, id est acceptio rei alienae invito domino; sed iste dubitat 
an retineat rem alienam; ergo dubitat an furetur. Et confirmatur: bene valet: retineo rem alienam invito 
domino; ergo commit furtum. Antecedens est dubium; ergo et consequens. Sedundum dictum Adriani 
est quod si possessor qui dubitat, reservet illam rem dominio proprio; quando comparaverit et fecerit 
sufficientem diligentiam, bene praescribit. Hoc probat quoniam tunc habet bonam et integram fidem. 
 19 The question whether the doubting possessor may retain the possession until its true owner is 
found, was also discussed briefly in the second quodlibetal question of Adrian. 
 20 Medina, p. 116. 





reject the idea that doubt is incompatible with good faith. The Gloss, followed by 
Panormitanus, taught more generally that doubt does not affect good faith. Adrian maintained 
as a general rule the opposite, but acknowledged, as will be explained below, that there are 
specific circumstances, which do allow the doubting possessor to prescribe. 
 
 From Adrian’s teachings Mancio derives two statements, viz. that a doubting possessor has 
a troubled conscience (conscientia laesa) and that he can acquire ownership through 
prescription in an exceptional case, i.e. when the acquisition of possession cannot be seen as 
occupation against the wish of the owner. Adrian had first described the opinion of the 
Ordinary Gloss to X 2.26.20 and the teachings of Panormitanus. The latter’s interpretation of 
C.34 q.1-2 c.5 he rejected. Augustine did not use the words ‘not knowing (nescire, ignorare)’ 
in the sense of ‘doubting on the basis of a plausible ground (ex probabili causa)’ but in the 
sense or erring, having a false conviction (falsa crudelitas), i.e. being convinced something is 
true which in reality is not true. Accordingly, the woman who voluntarily had sexual 
intercourse with a man, while being in a state of doubt as to whether he is married to another 
woman, is not excused from adultery. This opinion would be supported by X 4.21.2 and X 
5.39.44.21 Likewise, the possessor who, on the basis of a plausible ground (ex probabili 
causa) doubts whether an object is his, commits a sin by retaining it. If he, notwithstanding 
his doubts about proper entitlement, wishes to keep it, he commits a mortal sin, viz. theft. The 
regula magistralis rules that running the risk of committing a mortal sin, is a mortal sin 
itself.22 Theft is holding something against the owner’s wish. The one who is in doubt whether 
the thing he holds belongs to another, is in doubt whether or not he commits theft. If one 
doubts the former, one will also doubt the latter. For the argument that running the risk to sin, 
is a sin in itself, other authors sometimes referred to the biblical texts upon which this 
argument was supposed to be based, such as “he that loves danger, shall perish therein” (Sir 
3.26) and “whatever does not proceed from faith, is sin” (Rom 14.23).23 From the latter text 
many moral theologians gathered that good faith would require to act under the conviction 
that the act is permissible. The idea that retaining something while in a state of doubt is theft, 
also implies that a doubting possessor can have no legitimate possession. 
 
 The second statement of Adrian concerns the exceptional case where the possessor in bad 
faith or in doubt cannot be considered to occupy a possession against the owner’s will i.e. 
when, from the beginning, he is prepared to give back and is convinced of the necessity to 
perform a thorough examination in order to find the genuine owner but at the end of the 
required period for prescription, still has possession.24 According to Mancio’s paraphrase, 
Adrian taught that in such a case the possessor has good faith and will acquire ownership. 
 
 
3.3 The view of Domingo de Soto 
 
                                                 
 21 The case of X 4.21.2 is not identical to the case of C.34 q.1-2 c.5. In the decretal, the woman was 
not sure whether her first husband had died. She may not refuse marital duties to her second husband 
but cannot demand such duties from him. If she finds out her first husband is alive, she has to dismiss 
the second one. 
 22 Hadrianus, Quaestiones in quartum sententiarum librum, ed. Paris 1528, fol. 52rb-va (De 
sacramento penitentie, de restitutione § Hoc supposito primo decidam). 
 23 See e.g. Medina and Bañes.  
 24 Hadrianus fol. 53ra-53va (De sacramento penitentie, de restitutione § Tertia est opinio). 





 The third opinion, brought up by Mancio, is the one of his own master Domingo de Soto.25 
The doubting possessor may justly defend his position until the possession is vindicated in 
court. He will not enjoy, however, the benefit of prescription because as soon as he becomes 
aware of the fact that the thing belongs to another, he has to restore it, even if the time 
required for prescription has lapsed. The first statement is reminiscent of D. 22.1.25.2. The 
second seems obscure because becoming aware the thing belongs to another, will put a stop to 
the doubt. The argument is explained more fully in Soto’s own work De iustitia et iure. At the 
time one starts doubting on the basis of a plausible conjecture (probabili coniectura), 
prescription comes to an end, it says because the conscience is affected (vulnus conscientiae) 
and there is no longer good faith. ‘Good’ (bona) is the same as ‘sound’ (sana) and ‘easy’ 
(quieta).26 This opinion comes close to that of Mancio. Below it will become clear, that 
Mancio only in one respect disagrees with Soto, viz. where Soto acknowledged an exception, 
quite similar to the one of Adrian.  
 
 
4. Three ‘notes’ 
 
 After having presented this survey of existing opinions in favour of acquisition through 
prescription despite a doubting conscience, Mancio formulates three ‘notes’ or ‘observations’. 
Firstly, doubting is not the same as having a lax conscience because the latter always involves 
a sin, for example, by knowing that the possession belongs to another and not being prepared 
to restore it; or, doubting and not being prepared to carefully find out the truth.27 Doubting is 
being uncertain, which does not turn the conscience lax, because “when in doubt, the position 
of the possessor is the better one” (in dubiis melior est conditio possidentis).28 
 
 The second note says there are two kinds of doubt, viz. speculative doubt and practical 
doubt, which dichotomy is said to be further explained in X 5.39.44 and C.23 q.1 c.4.29 One 
of the first moral theologians who adopted a scholastic distinction between dubium 
speculativum and dubium practicum was Juan de Medina. Dubium speculativum is doubt 
concerning a fact or faculty, viz. the exact condition of the object: who is its owner? This 
                                                 
 25 Sarmiento 1985, p. 284: Tertia opinio est Magistri Soti in 4 De iustitia q.5 a. ultimo. Dicit 
namque, quod possessor qui dubitat rem esse suam, potest iuste illam defendere, quoadusque 
convincatur in iudicio; non tamen gaudeat beneficio praescriptionis, nam continuo atque cognoverit 
rem fuisse alienam, non obstante praescriptione, tenetur eam restituere. 
 26 Dominicus Sotus, De iustitia et iure libri decem, ed. Salamanca 1553, Lib. IV, q. 5, art. 4 (p. 
326). 
 27 Sarmiento 1985, pp. 284-285: Ex expositione huius notandum est aliud est habere conscientiam 
laxam et aliud dubitare. Conscientia laxa semper est coniuncta cum peccato, veluti cum quis intelligit 
se rem alienam possidere et non vult restituere, scilicet cum quis dubitat et non vult facere diligentiam 
ut assequatur veritatem. Habere dubium est esse in ancipite: cum quo dubio possessor non habet laxam 
conscientiam, nam in dubiis melior est conditio possidentis. 
 28 Previously, Vitoria had rejected the obvious link between sin and good faith. He taught that 
prescription requires a probable title (probabilis titulus) and the conviction to have acquired from the 
owner, which is a factual requirement, not to be described in terms of sinful or not sinful. Cf. 
Francisco de Vitoria, De justitia (ed. V. Beltrán de Heredia), part I, Madrid, 1934, ad ST II II 66 art.1, 
n. 48 (pp. 104-105). 
 29 Sarmiento 1985, p. 285: Item notandum quod duplex dubium, speculativum et practicum. Quod 
explicatur in cap. Inquisitioni, De sentendo excomunicationis et in cap. Quid culpatur 33 q.l. Verbi 
gratia, mulier quae dubitat an maritus iste sit suus, dubitat speculative; ceterum practice certa est quod 
tenetur recidere debitum. Est aliud exemplum: milites, qui dubitant an id bellum sit iustum, dubitant 
speculative; ceterum practice certi sunt quod tenetur parare suo principi: alias destruetur respublica. 





doubt does not necessarily exclude good faith. Dubium practicum is doubt concerning how to 
act, viz. whether it is permissible to retain the object or not. In order to clarify the distinction, 
Medina gave an example: if I buy from Peter, not knowing for sure that Peter is the owner or 
even knowing he is not, but supposing that in all probability Peter has authority to alienate the 
object, the doubt is speculative. In such a case prescription will run, while the conscience is in 
doubt. However, if I do not only doubt about a quality of the object but also whether I am 
allowed and entitled to justly retain the possession, the doubt is not only speculative, but also 
practical. This practical doubt affects the conscience, it wipes away good faith and prevents 
prescription from running. As a consequence, the woman in doubt whether her husband died, 
as in the case of X 4.21.2, may perform the marital duties when demanded. She is in doubt 
about a fact but, being primed by learned men, is probably convinced she has to perform these 
duties, when her second husband desires so. All this according to Medina.30 Mancio brings up 
a similar but slightly different distinction between these two kinds of doubt: speculative doubt 
results from a more theoretical reflection, practical doubt from a conviction about what is 
right or wrong to do. He produces two examples of merely speculative doubt. The woman 
who doubts her husband is really hers, doubts speculatively. From a practical point of view, 
she can at the same time be confident she has to perform her marital duties. Similarly, soldiers 
who doubt the war they are fighting is a just war, doubt speculatively. From a practical point 
of view, they are at the same time confident they have to obey their commander. If it were 
otherwise, the state would collapse.31  
 
 The third note holds that one can doubt a certain quality of a thing but be confident as 
regards another quality.32 One can be confident in having the condition required for Baptism, 
but doubt whether one has the required condition for receiving the sacraments of Penance and 
the Eucharist. Similarly, one can doubt whether the plot of land one possesses belongs to 
another and at the same time be confident there is no duty to restore the plot of land right 
away. The same can be said about the doubt of the woman. 
 
 
5. Mancio’s four conclusiones 
 
 Subsequently, Mancio formulates four conclusions (conclusiones). The first implies that 
good faith, as required for prescription, is human good faith, which cannot possibly exist in 
being absolutely sure about one’s entitlement; despite the remaining doubt and fear of the 
opposite, prescription is still legitimate.33 What suffices is the consciousness with which 
                                                 
 30 Medina, pp. 117-118. Previously Medina had explained that X 4.21.2 refers to the forum 
externum. If doubt continues to exist in conscience, the woman should abstain in order to avoid the 
risk of committing adultery. 
 31 For the distinction between speculative and practical judgments in the later Jesuits see Stone, 
M.W.F. and Van Houdt, T., “Probabilism and its methods. Leonardus Lessius and his contribution to 
the development of Jesuit casuistry”, Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 75 (1999), pp. 359-394, 
at pp. 371-375. 
 32 Sarmiento 1985, p. 285: 3°. Notandum quod potest quis dubitare de eadem re circa unum 
effectum et esse certus circa aliud. Verbi gratia, potest esse aliquis certus quod dispositio quod habet 
sit sufficiens ad baptismum, et dubitare an sit sufficiens ad poenitentiam et ad sacramentum 
Eucharistiae. Non aliter qui dubitat an fundus quem possidet sit alienus, est certus quod non tenetur 
continuo illum restituere. Idem dicendum est de uxore dubia. 
 33 Sarmiento 1985, pp. 285-286: His positis, sit prima conclusio: ad legitiman praescriptionem 
sufficit fides humana, licet non habeat omnem certitudinem; volo dicere quod, licet maneat scrupulus 
et formido in contrarium, legitima est praescriptio. Nam ea cognitio sufficit ad praescriptionem, qua 





people usually possess their things. That is: human good faith and the consciousness required 
is dependent on what the nature of things permits because as Aristotle taught, only a 
disordered tendency requires the same certainty in all things (indisciplinati ingenii est eandem 
in omnibus exigere certitudinem). As regards the things we discuss here, there is no other 
certainty than that of human good faith.34 
 
 The second conclusion is that the doubting possessor with a just title defends his possession 
until the court decides against him.35 According to Mancio this would follow from the 
principle “when in doubt the position of the possessor is the better one” (in dubiis melior est 
conditio possidentis) of VI 5.13.65. However, what Mancio quotes here, is the principle in its 
sixteenth century phrasing. The maxim of VI 5.13.65 reads “when the delict or the situation 
are equal, the position of the possessor is the stronger one” (in pari delicto vel causa potior 
est conditio possidentis). What Mancio has in mind here, is the Roman principle that a 
possessor has the procedural advantage of awaiting the plaintiff’s evidence. The burden of 
proof does not rest upon him. This is confirmed by Mancio’s reference to D. 43.17.2, which 
text reads “no matter what kind of possessor one is, because of the mere fact of being 
possessor, he has a stronger position than a non-possessor” (qualiscumque enim possessor hoc 
ipso, quod possessor est, plus iuris habet quam ille qui non possidet). 
 
 The third conclusion implies that a doubting possessor will never acquire ownership 
through prescription.36 This would follow from D. 41.1.48, mentioned above, more 
specifically from the words which Mancio quoted as “a buyer in good faith and not in doubt”. 
According to Mancio, the legislator had drawn here an explicit distinction between good faith 
and doubt. Accordingly, doubting faith is not the same as good faith. However, in Mancio’s 
quotation, the sequence of the words is altered and the conjunction ‘and’ (et) is added. 
Actually, the text of D. 41.1.48 reads “the possessor in good faith undoubtedly makes the 
fruits his own” (bonae fidei emptor non dubie (...) fructus (...) suos (...) facit) and not “a buyer 
in good faith and not in doubt” (emptor bonae fidei et non dubiae). The text does not draw 
any distinction and merely speaks about possessors in good faith. Mancio nevertheless 
concludes on the basis of this text, that good faith should be intact (integra) and sound (sana), 
whereas insecure faith is not sound but rather, bothers the conscience. As a consequence, 
doubts exclude the state of being in good faith. Furthermore, he argued that as all legal 
provisions say, prescription and the required good faith come to an end by mere joinder of 
                                                                                                                                                        
homines communiter res suas solent possidere; ea autem est fides humana; ergo. Deinde: ea cognitio 
exigenda est quam natura rei patitur, nam ut ait Aristoteles, indisciplinati ingenii est eandem in 
omnibus exigere certitudinem; sed haec materia de qua tractamus non habet aliam certitudinem nisi 
certitudinem fidei humanae; ergo. 
 34 What is called here a statement of Aristotle, was in fact a paraphrase of Thomas Aquinas (1225-
1274) in the third lectio of his commentary of Aristotle’s Ethics. 
 35 Sarmiento 1985, p. 286: secunda conclusio: possessor qui dubitat rem esse suam, iusto titulo 
illum defendit quoadusque in iudicio condemnetur. Haec est certissima, nam habetur in Regula iuris 
regula 66 quod in dubiis melior est conditio possidentis et ff. Uti possidetis lege iusta. 
 36 Sarmiento 1985, pp. 286-287: Tertia conclusio: qui possidet in dubio, numquam praescribit. 
Probatur hoc ff. De adquirendo rerum dominio lege 43, scilicet Emptor, ubi dicitur: emptor bonae 
fidei et non dubiae etiam ex re aliena facit fructus suos. In qua sententia legislator manifestam ponit 
differentiam inter bonam fidem et dubiam; ergo dubia fides non est bona fides. Deinde: bona fides 
idem est quod integra et sana; sed fides dubia non est fides sana, sed mordet conscientiam; ergo non 
est bona fides. Ultimo: per solam litis contestationem interrumpitur praescriptio et bona fides quae ad 
praescriptionem est necessaria, ut omnia iura clamant; sed litis contestatio tutum facit rem dubiam; 
ergo cum dubia fide non est praescriptio.  





issue (litis contestatio) i.e. when the possession is claimed in court. Joinder of issue turns 
certainty into uncertainty. Thus, when in a state of doubt, there can be no prescription. 
 
 The fourth conclusion is the most extensive. Mancio starts by referring to the opinion of his 
own master, Domingo de Soto, who stated that a woman in doubt as to whether her 
matrimony is valid, but shows sufficient care, may demand and perform marital duties 
because she is in good faith.37 Consequently, a possessor, showing sufficient care to find out 
the truth, despite not managing to expel all doubts, from that time starts to prescribe. Soto had 
expressed this opinion in his commentary on the fourth book of the Sentences.38 
 
 Subsequently, Mancio refers to three arguments which may support this view.39 First, if no 
prescription takes place, it will always remain uncertain who the owner is. This was one of the 
traditional arguments, derived from D. 41.3.1 and X 2.26.5, to justify prescription. Secondly, 
after observing sufficient care, there is no other way to acquire ownership of things. This 
argument is not further explained and remains somewhat obscure. Thirdly, after joinder of 
issue and a judicial sentence in favour of the possessor, prescription will certainly start to run 
despite the fact that until that time speculative doubt had persisted. As a consequence, 
remaining in candid uncertainty, after having observed sufficient care, is no obstacle for 
prescription to run. 
 
 This having been said, Mancio maintains that this fourth conclusion (in the case of 
sufficient care, prescription takes place) is only a plausible opinion and that the opposite 
vision (despite sufficient care, no prescription takes place) is more plausible.40 He criticizes 
the former because of its consequence that good faith, required for prescription, is the same as 
that required for legitimate possession. This he explains as follows. A doubting possessor 
either observes sufficient care or not. If he does not, he commits a sin by possessing. If he 
does, this faith obviously allows him to possess but would also suffice for prescription. Thus, 
the faith required for prescription would be the same good faith that is adequate for legitimate 
possession. However, as shown above this is not the case. 
 
                                                 
 37 Sarmiento 1985, p. 287: Quarta conclusio: possessor qui fecit diligentissime diligentiam ad 
assequendam verìtatem, et non potuit evincere dubium, ex tunc incipit praescrìbere. Haec est sententia 
Soti loco commemorato et In 4 dist. 27 q. 1 a.3: dicit enim quod mulier quae dubitat an iste marìtus sit 
suus post sufficientem diligentiam, potest petere et reddere debitum, quoniam iam est in bona fide. 
 38 Commentariorum fratris Dominici Soto (...) in Quartum Sententiarum, Tom. II, ed. Salamanca 
1569, pp. 104-110 (dist. 27, q. 1, art. 3). 
 39 Sarmiento 1985, p. 287: 2°. Probatur haec sententia: nam alias rerum dominia essent incerta in 
perpetuum contra finem legis praescrìptionis, quae in hoc est instituta, ne maneret rerum dominia 
incerta. Probatur sequentia: nam post factam sufficientissimam diligentiam, non restat alia via ad 
inveniendum rerum dominium. Ultimo: si esset contestata lis et pronuntiata sententia in favorem 
possidentis, certum est quod incipit praescriptio; et tamen adhuc perseverat dubium speculativum; 
ergo fides dubia post factam diligentiam non tollit praescriptionem. 
 40 Sarmiento 1985, pp. 287-288: Haec quarta conclusio est tantum probabilis et opposita videtur 
mihi probabilior, nam ex ista conclusione sequitur quod ea fides sufficit ad praescriptionem, quae 
sufficit ad legitimam possessionem, cuius contrarium supra demonstratum est. Probatur sequentia: 
nam vel ille qui possidet in dubio facit sufficientem diligentiam vel non; si non facit, peccat 
possidendo; si facit, ea fides sufficit ad praescriptionem; ergo ea fides sufficit ad praescriptionem, 
quae satis est ad legitimam possessionem. 





 Eventually, Mancio opts for the more plausible view.41 He substantiates this view primarily 
with his interpretation of X 5.39.44, where the Pope maintained that a woman, doubting 
whether the man is her husband, cannot demand performance of the marital duties he owes 
her. This results from being in doubt, Mancio argues, not from being negligent. Negligence 
would prevent her from performing these duties. If the Pope had intended to say that after 
observing sufficient care, the woman could demand and perform the marital duties, nothing 
would have been easier than to rule that after observing sufficient care, the man and woman 
are secure and safe in conscience to perform and demand these duties. However, that is not 
what the Pope stated here. He merely said that, as long as there is doubt, the duties owed are 
performed but not claimed. A woman who doubts the man is her husband is, after observing 
sufficient care, held to perform but cannot demand marital duties. Similarly, a doubting 
possessor, after observing care i.e. after making inquiries to find out the truth, cannot acquire 
ownership through prescription, although he does legitimately possess the thing. 
 
 
6. Mancio’s response to the arguments of Panormitanus and Adrian 
 
 To conclude his treatment of the question, Mancio refutes the arguments proposed by 
Panormitanus and Adrian. He had already partly rejected the opinion of Adrian in the fourth 
conclusion, together with that of Soto. The arguments of Panormitanus appear to be those 
substantiating the opinion he had previously labelled as that of the Ordinary Gloss to the Liber 
Extra. Mancio does not pronounce upon the argument of D. 22.1.25.2, i.e. that as long as no 
eviction has taken place, the possessor of a plot of land is to be considered in good faith and 
acquires the fruits by taking possession of these fruits, despite the fact he knows the land 
belongs to another. Medina, however, had done so previously. He considered the possessor in 
this provision to be in good faith only in view of acquiring the fruits. He is not in good faith in 
view of acquiring ownership. Moreover, the term good faith is used here in the sense of 
thinking the thing was not stolen and the vendor had authority to alienate.42 It seems that 
Mancio tacitly adopts a similar view. 
 
 (i) The first argument refuted by Mancio, is the one which interpreted the ignorance of the 
possessor, mentioned in the quotation of Augustine in C.34 q.1-2 c.5, as doubting ignorance.43 
However, Mancio draws a distinction between two kinds of ignorance, as Adrian had done 
before him.44 One is the ignorance of the mere lack of knowledge, which goes hand in hand 
with doubting on a probable ground. The other is a misinterpretation of things, which makes 
                                                 
 41 Sarmiento 1985, p. 288: 2°. Mulier quae dubitat utrum iste maritus sit suus post factam 
diligentiam, non potest petere debitum, licet teneatur reddere; ergo possessor in dubiis post factam 
diligentiam, non potest praescribere, licet possit possidere. Probatur antecedens, nam in cap. 
Inquisitioni, De sententia excomunicationis, negat Summus Pontifex posset peti debitum; eo in casu 
propter dubium, non propter negligentiam, nam si esset propter negligentiam non posset reddere 
debitum. Item: si Summus Pontifex voluisset asserere quod facta diligentia posset peti et reddere 
debitum, quid facilius quam praescribere et definire quod, facta sufficienter diligentia, sint securi et 
tuti in conscientia petendo et reddendo debitum. Hoc tamen non definivit Papa, sed tantummodo quod, 
stante dubio, redderetur debitum, non peteretur. 
 42 Medina, p. 117.  
 43 Sarmiento 1985, p. 288: Ad argumenta in contrarium pro opinione Panormitani. Ad primum 
respondetur quod ignorantia est duplex: altera est purae negationis, quae stat cum dubio probabili; 
altera est pravae dispositionis, qua quis iudicat certo rem esse suam, quae revera non est. Et haec 
excludit dubitationem, sicut et scientia; et de hac loquitur Augustinus. 
 44 Medina, p. 117. 





one confident to be entitled, which in reality is not the case. The latter ignorance, just as 
knowledge, excludes doubt and this is the ignorance Augustine is talking about. Thus, the 
possessor who according to Augustine can acquire through prescription, is not doubting that 
he is entitled. He is convinced that he is. Despite his ignorance of the truth, he is in good faith. 
 
 (ii) The second argument refuted is the one which identified the good faith required for 
legitimate possession with the good faith required for prescription.45 According to Mancio, 
such an assumption is false. Doubt prevents prescription from running, not so much because it 
would be impossible to possess something in doubt, but because a doubting faith is not sound 
(sana) and intact (integra), which is a requirement for prescription. 
 
 (iii, iv) The third and fourth arguments refuted are those derived from X 2.26.20.46 The 
canon Quoniam omne required three things, viz. that the possessor does not know another is 
entitled, that he does not commit a sin through the act of possessing, because no one should 
benefit from sins, but the most important is the requirement of good faith which should be 
sound (sana) and intact (integra), which is incompatible with being in doubt. 
 
 Finally, Mancio refutes three arguments, allegedly adduced by Adrian of Utrecht.47 
However, some of these are hard to find in Adrian’s writings. It may be that Mancio assumes 
these arguments tacitly underlay the opinion of Adrian that under certain conditions a 
doubting possessor can prescribe. The first is the view that a doubting possessor has no bad 
conscience in possessing because “when in doubt the position of the possessor is the better 
one” (in dubiis melior est conditio possidentis). Mancio rejects this opinion with his well-
known argument that the one who doubts has no intact faith (fides integra) for prescription. 
The second is the premise, which some derived from C.34 q.1-2 c.5, viz. that also the 
doubting possessor is in good faith and will acquire through prescription. As Mancio had 
stated previously, the opposite clearly results from X 4.21.2 and X 5.39.44. The third premise 
Mancio rejects together with the conclusion based on it, is the idea that a doubting possessor 
cannot possess legitimately. Doubt does not make him a thief. There can only be theft, if one 
retains a possession when knowing or culpably not knowing another is owner. Otherwise the 
ignorance is not culpable. Furthermore, in the latter case the doubt is speculative i.e. based on 
theoretical reasoning, but practical faith is present because the possessor is confident to be 
entitled to the possession. Similarly, as regards one and the same thing, a certain effect can be 
doubtful, whereas another is beyond doubt. 
                                                 
 45 Sarmiento 1985, p. 288: ad secundum negatur consequentia. Ratio enim quare fides dubia 
impedit praescriptionem, non est quia stricte dubio non possimus rem possidere, sed quoniam fides 
dubia non est sana et integra, quae est necessaria ad legitimam praescriptionem. 
 46 Sarmiento 1985, p. 289: Ad tertium et ad quartum argumentum ex capite finali De praescriptione 
respondetur tria esse necessaria ex definitione illius capitis, ut quis praescribat : primum est quod non 
habeat conscientiam rei alienae; deinde quod non peccet in possidendo, nam peccatum nulli debet 
suffragari; praescipue vero quod sit integra et sana fides, cui adversatur dubia fides. 
 47 Sarmiento 1985, p. 289: Ad argumenta Adriani. Et ad primum respondetur quod qui possidet in 
dubio, habet bonam conscientiam ad possidendum, nam in dubiis melior est condition possidentis. At 
vero non habet integram fidem ad praescribendum. Ad secundum nego antecedens, nam contrarium 
definitur manifeste cap. Dominus, De secundis nuptiis et cap. Inquisitioni superius allegato. Ad 
tertium nego minorem; et ad probationem nego consequentiam, nam furtum tantum est quando ex 
scientia vel ex culpabili ignorantia retineo rem alienam; ceterum in hoc casu est inculpabilis 
ignorantia. 2°. Dico: iste dubitat an res sit sua speculative, ceterum practice certus est quod sit sua 
quantum ad possessionem. Item dico quod est dubius de eadem re circa unum effectum, et est certus 
circa alium effectum. 







7. A range of opinions  
 
 The question, discussed by Mancio, is illustrative for the pluralistic and dialectic character 
of early modern scholasticism. Mancio does not present merely his own doctrine and own 
arguments but an entire range of different opinions, all with their own specific authoritative 
texts, arguments, frailties and strengths, pros and cons, advantages and disadvantages, etc. In 
a process of comparing and balancing the arguments, he establishes his own position. The 
main views on the consequences of being in doubt as to who is entitled, appeared to be the 
following. As a matter of fact, some of these views can go hand in hand but they do not 
always do so. 
 
 (i) Firstly, there was the idea that doubt does not affect good faith as required for 
acquisition of fruits and does not deprive the possessor of his advantageous procedural 
position (Passivlegitimation). Taking possession is not permissible when in a state of doubt 
regarding entitlement, but once in possession, doubt does not oblige the one in possession to 
abandon possession, the only exception being the right of the true owner to take possession. 
The main argument was found in D. 22.1.25.2 and in the maxim “when in doubt the position 
of the possessor is the better one (in dubiis melior est conditio possidentis)”. Such an 
approach can be traced, for example, in the Codex de restitutione et contractibus of Juan de 
Medina, published in 1546. According to Medina the statement of Adrian that the doubting 
possessor sins by exposing himself to the danger of committing theft, is not entirely true. A 
distinction should be drawn. When in equal doubt as to whether the object is his or belongs to 
Peter, the possessor is under no obligation to give it to Peter. In case of equal interests, it is 
permissible to act in one’s own interest. The possessor can retain possession as long as he is 
prepared to restore it when the truth is established.48  
 
 (ii) Secondly, there was the opposite view, defended, for example, by Adrian. Retaining 
possession, while being in doubt, is theft. This can be seen as applying the regula magistralis, 
which rules that in case of doubt, one has to choose the safe side, i.e. to follow the course of 
action which cannot possibly affect the conscience (in dubiis tutior pars est eligenda) even if 
there is a good chance that the risky but more advantageous course of action will neither 
affect the conscience. Thus, if a possessor has reason to doubt, there are in theory two 
possibilities: either he himself is entitled to the object or another would be entitled. In order to 
avoid committing a theft, he should act according to the latter situation and abandon his 
possession. 
 
 (iii) In the third place, there was the view that doubt does not take away the good faith 
required for prescription. When in doubt, a possessor may be under the obligation to make 
inquiries in an attempt to establish the truth; but when the required period of time has lapsed 
without finding the owner, he will, despite his doubts, acquire ownership. As we saw, this was 
                                                 
 48 However, in case the possessor is in doubt whether the thing belongs to Peter or to John, 
retaining the possession is not allowed. See Medina, p. 118: Corrolarie sequitur, non est indistincte 
verum, quod ait Adrianus, (...), quod qui rem aliquam detinet, dubius an sit aliena, peccet: quia se 
periculo furti exponit: si enim dubitat an sit sua, an Petri, ubi dubium est aequilibre, non tenetur rem 
Petro dare, etiamsi tute possit; eo quod forte id cederet in praeiudicium suum, quia forte res est sua: 
modo autem magis tenetur homo suae indemnitatis quam alienae consulere, ubi caetera sunt paria. (...) 
Secus ubi possidens rem scit non esse suam, dubitat tamen an sit Petri, an Ioannis: tunc non potest 
iuste rem illam sibi ipsi retinere, nisi de consensu illorum, qui suam esse praetendunt.  





the opinion of the Gloss to the Liber Extra and Panormitanus. Strangely enough, this view, 
which seems to establish the rule for the forum externum, was brought up by Mancio while 
discussing the forum internum, and not just from a comparative perspective. The view was 
presented as clashing with other opinions, which clearly pronounced upon obligations in 
conscience. This approach suggests that some scholars defended the validity of certain rules 
of law also for the realm of moral theology. In any event, it is illustrative of the 
interwovenness of legal and theological reasoning and the distinct role of legal provisions and 
arguments in moral theological thinking. 
 
 (iv) As a matter of fact, this third opinion was also not tenable from the perspective of 
tutiorism. The one who retains possession while being in doubt, runs the risk of committing 
theft and accepting that risk is a sin in itself. Accordingly, after making such a wrong choice, 
his faith cannot be said to be intact (integra), sound (sana) and stable (non vacillans), as 
required for prescription.  
 
 (v) Adrian and Soto on the one hand stuck to the regula magistralis, but on the other did 
not apply it in an unequivocally rigoristic manner. The doubting possessor is under a 
continuous moral obligation to seek the truth. Moreover, he has to part with the possession as 
soon as he finds the true owner. However, if he did not yet succeed in finding the latter by the 
required time for prescription came to an end, he acquires ownership. His conduct cannot be 
qualified as sinful. He did not occupy the possession against the owner’s wish. Thus, he is no 
thief and does not lack the requisite good faith for prescription. This fifth opinion comes close 
to the third.  
 
 (vi) Finally, there was the opinion, that once prescription had started in good faith, later 
emerging doubt would not put an end to prescription. This rule was already defended by 
Bartolus in his commentary upon D. 41.3.5.49 From the perspective of Roman law, this goes 
without saying because even later emerging bad faith would not cancel out the prescription. 
The latter principle was expressed in the medieval maxim ‘mala fides superveniens non 
nocet’, based on i.a. D. 41.3.15.2. As seen above, the same principle was applied to doubt. 
Prierias defended this view in his Summa Sylvestrina, published in 1516. He stated that this 
rule i.e. later emerging doubt does not extinguish the prescription, would also be the rule for 
the forum internum. Only the sincere conviction to possess in bad faith can put an end to 
prescription. Doubt has no effect. 
 
 Prierias substantiated the rule with a new theoretical basis: “since doubt stands midway 
between two contradictory opinions, if it affects one of these, it does not cancel it out to a 
greater extent than it does the other, and if circumstances do not change preference should be 
given to the opinion adhered to at first and the position of the possessor is the stronger one.”50 
Applied to the doubting possessor, the two contradictory opinions probably are ‘I can retain 
the possession’ and ‘I have to abandon the possession’. If the possessor adhered to the former 
opinion and subsequently, his choice was affected by doubt, the doubt would not wipe it away 
and the initial opinion is the one he should follow since he already ‘possessed’ it. That would 
                                                 
 49 Bartolus ad D. 41.3.5 n. 9-10, see In primam partem Digesti Novi Bartoli a Saxoferrato 
commentaria, ed. Basle 1588, p. 293. 
 50 Sylvestrinae summae pars secunda, ed. Antwerp 1578, ad verbum ‘praescriptio I’ (p. 305): Quod 
etiam probat ratio: quia cum dubitatio aequaliter mediet inter contradictorias opiniones, si uni 
supervenit, eam non tollit plus quam aliam: et caeteris paribus fauendum erit illi, quae prius inerat et 
potior erit conditio possidentis. 





imply that Prierias applied the maxim “when in doubt the position of the possessor is the 
better one (in dubiis melior est conditio possidentis)” not to the protection of possession of an 
object (the level of the law of property) but to the protection of the ‘possession’ of a certain 
moral conviction (the level of moral theology). In conscience, the possessor is allowed to 
stick to his initial assumption that he can retain, despite his later arising doubts i.e. that there 
can be a moral duty to abandon possession. If this is indeed the purport of this statement of 
Prierias, it looks like a precursor of the later probabilism, which adopted the maxim “when in 
doubt the position of the possessor is the better one (in dubiis melior est conditio possidentis)” 
as a fundamental moral-theological principle, implying that when in doubt which precept to 
obey or what line of action to follow, one is free to adopt any plausible view and does not 
have to follow the most plausible one.51 However, in the secondary literature Prierias is 
usually labelled as antiprobabilist.52  
 
 
8. Mancio’s own position in the debate 
 
 Juan de Medina and Mancio stood on the threshold of a tradition, discussing the 
consequences of the possessor’s doubt as to who is entitled to his possession, specifically 
about the possibility of acquiring ownership through prescription. Mancio did not identify the 
good faith required for legitimate possession with the good faith required for prescription. The 
first was not entirely incompatible with having doubts. Here, Mancio applied the maxim 
“when in doubt the position of the possessor is the better one (in dubiis melior est conditio 
possidentis)”. For the purpose of acquiring the fruits and for the procedural advantage of not 
having the burden of proof (Passivlegitimation) the doubting possessor can be considered as 
being in good faith and as having legitimate possession. In this respect, Mancio followed the 
teachings of Juan de Medina and rejected the view of Adrian, that in case of doubt it is not 
permissible to retain possession for any other purpose than finding out the truth. By the end of 
the sixteenth century many scholars no longer extensively discussed these consequences of 
doubt for legitimate possession, or at least not in relation to those for prescription, but the 
view that doubt and legitimate possession are not incompatible, seems to have become 
prevailing. The possessor is under the obligation to observe sufficient care, to find out the 
truth and possibly to hand over possession to the genuine owner. As long as there is still 
doubt, however, the present possession is protected. The Augustinian Pedro de Aragón (1539-
1592) is one of the few who imposed a further obligation on the doubting possessor. In his 
commentary upon the Secunda Secundae, published in 1584, he maintained that the doubting 
possessor is safe in conscience when he shares his possession pro rata of his doubt with the 
                                                 
 51 See for the meaning of the maxim according to probabilism: Schlüβler, R. “Zur Geschichte des 
Besitzindividualismus”, Wirtschaftsethische Perspektiven VI Korruption, Strafe und Vertrauen, 
Verteilungs- und Steuergerechtigkeit, Umweltethik, Ordnungsfragen [Schriften des Vereins für 
Sozialpolitik, Neue Folge; SVS 228/VI] (V. Arnold, ed), Berlin, 2002, pp. 321-336. Schlüβler, R., “On 
the atonomy of probabilism”, Moral philosophy on the threshold of modernity [The new synthese 
historical library, 57], (J. Kraye and R. Saarinen, eds), Dordrecht, 2005, pp. 91-113. Schlüβler, R., 
“Scholastic moral theology and moral self-ownership: some preliminary issues”, Transformations in 
medieval and early-modern rights discourse [The new synthese historical library, 59], (V. Mäkinen 
and P. Korkman, eds), Dordrecht, 2006, pp. 151-172. 
 52 Schmitt, A., Zur Geschichte des Probabilismus. Historisch-kritische Untersuchung über die 
ersten 50 Jahre desselben, Innsbruck, 1904, p. 5, referring to Concina’s Storia del Probabilismo. 





one he thinks might be entitled. In case he has no idea who this might be, he should grant a 
share to the poor.53  
 
 As regards prescription, Mancio sticks to the regula magistralis of tutiorism. In his view 
even the exception, accepted by Adrian and his own master Soto, viz. that if the doubting 
possessor performs scrupulous investigations and is prepared to cede possession to the owner, 
he can acquire ownership through prescription, was a bridge too far. Surely, this stance was 
plausible (probabilis) but another position was more plausible (probabilior) and should be 
followed: also, after observing the required diligence, the doubting possessor will not acquire 
through prescription. The maxim “when in doubt, the position of the possessor is the better 
one” (in dubiis melior est conditio possidentis) cannot be applied to prescription. Doubt 




9. To conclude: “dubium superveniens non nocet” revisited 
 
 Mancio does not draw a distinction between doubt at the time possession was acquired and 
later emerging doubt. As we saw, such a distinction was relevant in the teachings of Bartolus 
(for the forum externum) and Prierias (for confession). By the end of the sixteenth century it 
was also adopted by moral theologians. The opinion that doubt affects good faith, as defended 
by Mancio, became the prevailing one for the situation that doubt was already present at the 
time possession was acquired. The opinion of Soto, defended in his commentary on the 
Sentences, that a doubting faith after having observed sufficient care is no obstacle for 
prescription to run, was apparently rejected. The Dominican Domingo Bañes (1528-1604) 
maintained in his Decisiones de iustitia et iure (1580) that prescription starts at the time the 
possessor observed sufficient care and was confident that no other was entitled. After 
observing such care, he had human faith (fides humana) which sufficed for prescription. 
Speculative doubt could still be present, in the sense that the possessor realized it was in 
theory still possible that his conviction would appear to be incorrect; but this speculative 
doubt does not affect good faith. A probable or plausible doubt (dubium verisimile et 
probabile) on the other hand, would prevent prescription from running.54 Soto had taught that 
sufficient care did not necessarily have to expel such probable doubt, but according to the 
later prevailing view it should.  
 
 In general terms, Mancio considers it impossible to acquire ownership through prescription 
while being in doubt. Only few authors, such as Pedro de Aragon, followed this stance and 
did not draw a distinction between doubt at the beginning and supervening doubt. The 
possessor has the benefit of the doubt as regards the use of the possession (entitlement to 
fruits, protection by possessory remedies) not as regards prescription.55 However, Domingo 
Bañes had already adopted the view of Prierias that doubt would not affect the prescription 
                                                 
 53 Petrus de Aragon, In secundam secundae Divi Thomae Doctoris Angelici comentaria, ed. Lyons 
1597, p. 120 (Quaestio LXII, see ‘ad fundamentum glossae’, where Aragon challenges the opinion of 
Adrian). Later authors do expand the debate, amongst other things, to the problem whether the 
possessor who doubts out of ignorance can retain the possession (dubium practicum) or is in bad faith, 
if he does not abandon possession. 
 54 Dominicus Bañes, Decisiones de iustitia et iure, ed. Venice 1595, Praeambulum ad Q. 62, p. 
104-106. 
 55 Aragon, p. 120: (…) tantum dici ad usum rei in dubiis esse meliorem conditionem possidentis, 
non autem ad praescriptionem. 





when it already had started to run. This became the prevailing view among many Jesuits by 
the end of the sixteenth century. Moral theologians as Luis de Molina (1535-1600), Leonardus 
Lessius (1554-1623) and Juan de Lugo (1583-1660) opted for this, more lenient, approach of 
Prierias and not for the more rigoristic one of Mancio and Pedro de Aragon. They supported 
their opinion by referring to the maxim “when in doubt the position of the possessor is the 
better one” (in dubio melior conditio possidentis).56 It is not always clear whether this maxim 
is understood here in the sense that the possessor should be protected in his possession of the 
object or in the sense that he should be protected in his ‘possession’ of the moral conviction 
he can retain the possession. All the same, it is well-known that many of these Jesuits adhered 
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 56 Ludovicus Molina, De iustitia et iure, Tomus I, ed. Genève 1733, p. 149 (Tractatus II, disp. 63, 
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